This paper sets up a model, where multinationals compete in quantities and domestic firms form a competitive fringe. Within this framework, we analyse the relationship between market concentration, international outsourcing and the industry price-cost margin. The empirical results of a panel of 66 industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s strongly confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Market concentration and international outsourcing are positively related to industry price-cost margins. In a thought experiment, we show that industry price-cost margins would have decreased by 0.4 percentage points more in the 1990s, if international outsourcing had not changed since 1990. In addition, international outsourcing accounts for a convergence in margins across industries in the last decade.
1 Introduction 1 "We live in an age of outsourcing." (Grossman and Helpman, 2002b, p. 1) In recent years, this phenomenon has become a key issue in the political and scientiÞc debate on possible adverse consequences of globalization, thereby mainly focussing on wage and employment effects.
2 However, despite the salient role of international outsourcing for modern industrial production Helpman 2002b, 2003) , an empirical assessment of the relationship between international outsourcing and industrial economic measures, like the price-cost margin, is so far missing in the literature. To close this gap is the purpose of this paper.
Empirical research in industrial economics on the relationship between globalization and price-cost margins has particularly focussed on the imports-as-market-discipline (IMD) hypothesis. There is a well-established consensus that imports are a source of competitive discipline, which seems robust to the choice of import competition measure (Geroski and Jacquemin, 1981; de Ghellinck et al., 1988; Levinsohn, 1993; Katics and Petersen, 1994; Co, 2001) . The IMD hypothesis has been tested on both the Þrm level (Levinsohn, 1993) and the industry level (Co, 2001) , without distinguishing between Þnal and intermediate goods imports. Since Þrm level data for price cost margins and the required explanatory variables are not accessible for a large sample of countries and a sufÞciently long period, we stick to industry level information. 3 Conveniently, import data comprise both Þnal goods and intermediate goods (components) . While the former may be interpreted as a source of competitive pressure, we argue that access to foreign labor markets and increased trade in intermediate goods may counteract this effect. In fact, the IMD hypothesis interprets all imports as Þnal goods imports, which is at odds with the stylized facts on the composition of trade (Feenstra, 1998) . Interpreting all imports as 1 We are indebted in Nigel Driffield, Michael Pfaffermayr and Laura Rondi for helpful comments and suggestions. 2 Arndt (1997) , Deardorff (2001) , Egger (2001, 2003) , Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Jones (2000) , Venables (1999) . 3 As Tybout (2003, p. 5 ) points out, "import competition can only be observed at the industry level".
Þnal goods ones could result in an underestimation of the importance of the IMD effect of Þnal goods. Moreover, assuming that intermediate goods imports (international outsourcing) exert the same impact as Þnal goods imports as in previous IMD studies may be misleading. Accordingly, one would wish to decompose overall industry imports into the two components, Þnal and intermediate goods, to obtain unbiased estimates for both types of imports.
Previous research has pointed to an important nexus between industry price-cost margins, changing market concentration and multinationality. 4 This paper provides Þrst insights into the relationship between international outsourcing and industry price-cost margins in a large cross-section of industries and EU countries in three years of the 90s.
Thereby, we understand international outsourcing in a broad sense including intra-Þrm (Dunning, 1988, calls A thought experiment underpins the importance of international outsourcing for pricecost margins in the EU. In the average low-PCM industry, price-cost margins would have decreased 0.5 percentage points faster between 1991 and 1998, if outsourcing had not changed since 1990. The reduction in the outsourcing activity of the high-margins industries has led to an additional decrease in their margins by 0.1 percentage points over the same period. In that way, cross-border sourcing behaviour has induced a convergence in margins across industries within the EU12 area in the last decade.
2 Theoretical Background
The Basic Model
We consider a model where n multinational Þrms compete on m markets with a given number of N j home producers, j = 1, ..., m. The latter form a competitive fringe and can only serve their respective home market. The production technology of competitive home producers is represented by a convex cost function of the form C x (x j ) = 1 2 x 2 j , with x j being the output of an individual Þrm active in market j and C x (·) being identical for all competitive Þrms both within and across markets. Noteworthy, competitive Þrms do not have access to international outsourcing. 5 Total production costs of multinational
s´depend on total Þrm output P j q kj and the degree of international outsourcing a
where O k denotes the amount of intermediate goods used in the production of multinational k.
6 Parameter s captures all trade costs induced by cross-border tansactions in the case of outsourcing. These costs include tariffs, non-tariff barriers and transport costs. We assume positive and increasing marginal costs of producing output q k , i.e. ∂C (·) /∂ ³ P j q kj´> 0 and ∂ 2 C (·) /∂ ³ P j q kj´2 > 0, respectively. Since international outsourcing means access to cheaper resources abroad, implies that larger Þrms gain more from international outsourcing than smaller ones. In and Kierzkowski (2001) , are especially pronounced in the case of international outsourcing. 9 We hypothesize that coordination costs, denoted as τa k O , depend on the degree of international outsourcing rather than on the absolute value of imported intermediate goods.
The inverse demand functions for the m markets are given by
Thereby, Q j ≡ P k q kj is the aggregate output of all multinational Þrms in market j. X j ≡ N j x j denotes the overall output of competitive home producers. Use
Then, the proÞt maximization problem of multinational Þrms is given by
7 In contrast to the seminal paper of Grossman and Helpman (2002a) we do not formalize the decision problem of Þrms with respect to in house production and outside purchases. Rather and as usual in the trade literature dealing with international outsourcing, our focus lies on the cost-saving effect induced by the internationalization of production. 8 Of course, the above mentioned properties of C (·) only hold for interior solutions, implying that at least some of the intermediate goods are produced by the multinaltional Þrm at home. 9 Compare also Jones (2000) for a discussion on the importance of service links and other coordination/communication costs. Glass and Saggi (2001) also introduce this type of costs. 10 Due to the assumption of competitive home producers, multinational Þrms face demand curves of the form
according to (1). In the case of identical multinationals and symmetric markets, the Þrst-order conditions for an interior solution (q > 0, a O > 0) are given by
where q ij = q, a k O = a O , A j = A and N j = N have been used. The equilibrium concentration rate, measured as output of an individual multinational producer relative to market output, and the price-cost margin of the industry are then given by
where X = Np and p = 
Comparative Static Analysis
In the following, we analyze how trade costs s, coordination costs τ , market access (multinationality) m, the number of multinationals n and the number of competitive Þrms N affect output q, outsourcing coefficient a O , concentration rate CR and price-cost margin
Proposition 1 If marginal production costs are increasing and the cost-saving advantage induced by international outsourcing is decreasing in trade costs
O ∂s > 0, respectively, an increase in trade costs s as well as in coordination costs τ lowers both outsourcing coefficient a O and output q. Moreover, s as well as τ has a negative impact on concentration rate CR and price-cost margin P CM ind .
Proof. See the appendix. An increase in s (τ ) implies that international outsourcing becomes less attractive, so that multinationals tend to decrease their outsourcing activities. Since outsourcing makes the production of output q more attractive, a decline in a O , implied by an increase in s (τ ), has a negative impact on the output of multinationals q. Be aware that trade costs s have also a direct positive impact on C (·), according to ∂ 2 C (·) ∂ (mq) ∂s > 0. Thus, output q unambiguously decreases with s (τ ). But, if the output of multinationals declines, the output of competitive Þrms x increases due to a reduction in the competitive pressure.
According to the latter, a decline in output q not only reduces P CM mult , but also the concentration rate CR. Since competitive Þrms sell their products at marginal costs, the impact of trade costs s (coordination costs τ ) on P CM ind turns out to be unambiguously negative.
The impact of multinationality m on the variables of interest is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in multinationality (market access) m increases outsourcing coefficient a O but has no impact on output q. Moreover and as a consequence, m has also no impact on concentration rate CR and price-cost margin P CM ind .
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is the following. First, access to an additional market at a given outsourcing coefficient a O and a given output level at each individual market q implies that unit production costs increase. Thus, a reduction of q becomes attractive. This is a negative direct effect. Second, access to an additional market at a given q makes outsourcing more attractive so that the outsourcing coefficient a O increases. However, an increase in the outsourcing coefficient a O reduces production costs C (·), which gives an incentive to increase the output in each market q. This is a positive indirect effect.
It turns out that both effects exactly cancel out in equilibrium so that q is not affected by a change in multinationality m. Note thereby, that q is independent of m since the outsourcing coefficient a O is increasing in m. Moreover, since q is not affected, it is clear that a change in (market access) m neither has an impact on CR nor on P CM ind .
Of course, our Þnding that m does neither affect CR nor P CM ind critically depends on two restrictive assumptions, namely that markets are symmetric and that access to an additional market does not imply more competition due to an increase in the number of multinationals n.
The impact of the number of multinationals n on a O , q, CR and P CM ind is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in the number of multinational Þrms n reduces both outsourcing coefficient a O and output per market q. Moreover, concentration rate CR is decreasing in the number of multinationals n, whereas the impact on the price-cost margin of the industry P CM ind is ambiguous.
The intuition for this Þnding is that an increase in the number of multinational Þrms n reinforces competition, so that both q and a O decline. The latter effect arises since a decline in output q makes outsourcing less attractive, according to
. The impact of the Þrm number n on the concentration rate CR is negative, since individual output q declines whereas market output nq + Nx increases. Concerning its impact on P CM mult , n reveals two opposing effects. First, an increase in n has a direct negative effect on P CM mult , according to P CM mult = 1/ (n |ε|). Second, nq increases in n implying that the elasticity of demand with respect to prices |ε|, goes down. This is an indirect positive effect of the number of multinationals on P CM mult . Since in equilibrium Þrms are selling at the elastic range of the demand function, i.e. n |ε| > 1, P CM mult turns out to be unambiguously declining in the number of multinational Þrms n. Finally, be aware that total output of multinationals nq increases at the expense of the production of competitive suppliers Nx. Thus, n · CR unambiguously increases with n, according to (5). 11 Together with dP CM mult /dn < 0, there are two opposing effects of n on P CM ind , according to (6). Since it is not clear which of the two effects is stronger, dP CM ind /dn turns out to be ambiguous.
Finally, the impact of the number of competitive Þrms N on the variables of interest is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increase in the number of competitive Þrms N lowers both outsourcing coefficient a O and output q. Moreover, N has a negative impact on concentration rate CR and the price-cost margin of the industry P CM ind .
An increase in N implies a higher competitive pressure so that multinationals reduce output q. As argued in the intuition for Proposition 3, this makes outsourcing activities less attractive. Thus, also a O is negatively related to N . Due to its negative impact on q, an increase in N also implies a decline in CR, since competitive Þrms increase their output at the expense of multinational ones. Finally, since the economy becomes more competitive, N reduces P CM mult so that P CM ind is also decreasing in N.
Summary of the Theoretical Hypotheses
From our theoretical analysis above we would expect that an increase in international outsourcing in terms of output of multinationals a O induced by a decline in trade costs s, coordination costs τ or the number of national competitiors N goes along with an increase in the concentration rate CR and the price-cost margin per industry P CM ind . A decline in the competitive pressure induced by a decrease in the number of multinationals n would also increase both outsourcing coefficient a O and concentration rate CR. However, the impact of n on the price-cost margin per industry P CM ind turns out to be ambiguous.
Finally, access to an additional market, i.e. an increase in m, is solely absorbed by an increase in outsourcing coefficient a O . Neither CR nor P CM ind are affected, since output per market q turns out to be constant. However, as pointed out above, the Þnding that m does neither affect CR nor P CM ind , may critically depend on our symmetry assumptions.
Data and Empirical Results
To construct an empirical model, we build upon insights from our theoretical analysis that price-cost margins per industry are only directly affected by Þrm number n, while all the other exogenous variables (s, τ , m and N ) impact on P CM ind only through changes of the concentration rate and the price-cost margin of multinationals (P CM mult ), which are directly related to changes of Þrm output q and (at least for a given m) outsourcing coefficient a O . Hence, in our empirical analysis we use CR5 (the concentration rate of the top Þve Þrms with respect to their output in each industry) and a O as approximate but observable measures of changes in the Þrm numbers (n or N , respectively), overall trade costs s in a wide sense and coordination costs τ . 12 In addition, we control for multinationality, which may have an impact on price-cost margins in an asymmetric world
(not in the case of symmetric markets above). Finally, we know from our theoretical investigation that the impact of multinationality m and the outsourcing coefficient a O on the one hand, and the concentration rate CR5 and a O on the other hand, are not necessarily independent. Therefore, we should control for interactions of these two pairs.
In addition to the variables that are based on our theoretical considerations, we control for further variables which may be related to price-cost margins, according to earlier empirical Þndings. Motivated by Co (2001) and Levinsohn (1993) , we use the investmentto-output ratio (KO) to control for differences in margins due to capital intensity. 13 The
Þnal goods import-to-output ratio (IMP ) is also used as an explanatory variable to see whether the IMD hypothesis is still supported if we distinguish between Þnal and intermediate goods imports. As suggested by Co (2001) , we also control for the possible 12 We cannot control for the direct impact of Þrm number n, since no data is available for this variable.
Similarly, data on trade and coordination costs are partly unobserved and usually affected by substantial measurement errors (see Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2003) . 13 Fors (1997) and Griliches (1998) illustrate that investment to output ratios are good approximations of changes in capital stocks. For some Þrm-level data bases, capital stocks are available from balance sheets (see Konings and Vandenbussche, 2002) . Unfortunately, information on capital stocks is not available at the industry level.
interaction between the concentration rate CR5 and the Þnal goods import-to-output ratio IMP .
We estimate two-way Þxed effects regressions, which account for Þxed time and countryindustry effects in order to control for unobserved cycle and cross-section speciÞc inßu-ences, thereby reducing the possible omitted variable bias. The estimated speciÞcation
where i = 1, ..., 66, j = 1, ..., 11 and t = 1991, 1994, 1998 are industry, country 14 and year indices, respectively. Martin (1979) and Geroski (1982) address the problem of potential endogeneity in margins regressions. Martin (1979) suggests to account for a partial adjustment scheme. Given that we have only three data points in the time dimension of each industry in a typical EU economy at hand, this is impossible in our case. Rather, we follow Pirotte (1999) and interpret the Þxed effects parameter estimates as valid approximations of the short run elasticities. Due to the lack of appropriate instruments, we use lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables. 15 Of course, this strategy is only helpful for longitudinal panels of data. In cross-sections, the inclusion of lagged values cannot help to overcome the endogeneity problem, and Martin's (1979) and Geroski's (1982) arguments apply. To be more precise, we use lagged CR5 and a O since they are jointly determined with PCM in our theoretical model. Similarly, we use only the lagged Þnal goods import-to-output ratio IMP and multinationality m. See Chung 14 The EU member countries as of before 1995, where Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as a single economy due to the availability of trade data: Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK. 15 We may assume all lagged variables as predetermined, i.e., independent of subsequent structural disturbances (a standard assumption in dynamic panel econometrics). Greene (1997, p. 714) argues that "variables that are predetermined in a model can be treated, at least asymptotically, as if they were exogenous in the sense that consistent estimates can be obtained when they appear as regressors."
(2001) for a similar approach in a different setting. As motivated in Co (2001), we also include m i(t−2) since the impact of multinationality on P CM ind may be less immediate.
µ ij are Þxed country-industry effects, which control for all unobserved country, industry and country-by-industry effects. Noteworthy, in this design pure country or industry effects are nested in µ ij , but µ ij additionally controls for country speciÞc deviations from the average industry effects, which may be due to legal, institutional, infrustructure and other aspects. 16 λ t denotes Þxed time effects to account for a common cyclical behavior of margins (Domowitz et al., 1986) , and ε ijt is a classical error term.
For the empirical assessment, we use data on gross production, value added, gross Þxed capital formation and wages at the NACE 3-digit level from New Cronos (EUROSTAT) for EU12 countries. As usual, we deÞne the P CM ind by the Lerner index: For each Þrm in a speciÞc industry, the index is deÞned as P j −s j ln(s j ), with s j denoting country j's production share in overall EU12 production.
17 Hence, the index is maximized as the distribution is uniform. Suppose that production plants are all of the same size, and multinationals operate only a single plant in a country. Then, the index rises with the number of markets the multinational operates in. Therefore, the index represents a measure of multinationality. We use the industry average of the multinational Þrm-speciÞc index values. The data are interpolated in order to obtain an estimate of CR5 and m for 1990, which is the Þrst year reliable trade data are available for. Since CR5
and multinationality are published in an aggregated form of NACE 3-digit (called SPES), the industry and trade data are further reclassiÞed to SPES, too (see Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 2001) . We exclude all country-industry observations from the analysis, which
are not observed at least twice in the three years under consideration and come up with 2020 observations in the regression analysis. The P CM ind in 1991, 1994 and 1998 is explained by contemporaneous explanatory variables (observed in 1991, 1994 and 1998) and lagged (observed in 1990, 1993 and 1997) as well as twice-lagged variables (observed in 1989, 1992 and 1996) . Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the full sample and two subsamples.
The Þrst subsample 18 consists of those industry-by-country pairings (ij) with an average PCM higher than the overall mean (high PCM), and the second subsample are the other pairings (low PCM). According to the table, the two subsamples signiÞcantly differ not only in terms of the PCM but also of almost all explanatory variables. SpeciÞcally, the Þnal goods imports to output ratio and outsourcing are higher for the low-PCM subsample, while all other variables are signiÞcantly lower. These differences lead us to the suggestion 17 In our data, the entropy index exhibits a minimum value of 0.14 for the casting, forging, and Þrst treatment of metal industry and a maximum one of 0.83 for the dairy products industry. Average level and standard deviation are given for the full sample and two subsamples in Table 1 , below. 18 To deÞne the subsamples, we average all data over time.
that the impact of these variables on the industry PCM might also differ between the two subsamples. Accordingly, we run the regressions also for the two subsamples, separately.
> Table 1 <   Table 2 presents the results from nine regressions: Models 1-3 for the full sample and two sub-samples. Model 1 corresponds to (7), and Models 2 and 3 are restricted versions of (7). In Model 2, we assume that all interaction terms have zero impact (i.e., β 6 = β 8 = β 9 = 0), and in Model 3 we additionally assume that Þnal goods imports and outsourcing have the same impact (i.e., β 5 = β 7 ). However, for both the full sample and the high-PCM subsample Models 2 and 3 are rejected against Model 1 on the basis of an F-test. Only for the low-PCM subsample the more parsimonious models are not rejected. According to the F-test of Model 3 against Model 2, the latter is supported in all cases. Below, we base the further analysis and discussion on the Model 3 parameters for both the full sample and the two subsamples. However, pooling of the parameters for the low-PCM and the high-PCM subsamples in the full sample is rejected according to an F-test. Therefore, the respective heterogeneous parameter estimates are relevant.
Note that the reported adjusted R 2 Þgures are very high. The reason is that the µ ij (i.e., the industry-by-country dummy variables) account for a lot of variation in the data. Of course the corresponding within R 2 Þgures are considerably lower. 19 However, they also point to a good explanatory power of our model.
> Table 2 <
Because of the presence of interaction terms, the results in Table 2 do not allow for direct conclusions on the marginal effects. The required information can be obtained by
Þrst differencing (7) with respect to the variables of interest. Noteworthy, the marginal impact varies across observations and it is usually evaluated at the sample means of the respective interacted variables. 20 The positive average marginal impact of multinational activity for the full sample or the high-PCM subsample is not signiÞcant after controlling for market concentration and intra-Þrm components trade activity (internalization). This is in accordance with our theoretical hypotheses. However, there is a signiÞcant positive marginal effect for the low-PCM subsample. 21 In line with previous empirical work and with our theoretical model, we identify a positive direct impact of lagged industry concentration on margins. Similar to Co's (2001) result for the US, this impact is the lower, the larger the industry (in our case: Þnal goods) imports (see interaction term (6) in Table 2 ).
On average, the marginal effect of concentration is insigniÞcant. However, it is negative and signiÞcant at 10% in the high-PCM subsample and insigniÞcant in the low-PCM subsample, which cannot be explained by our theoretical model. There is evidence in favor of the IMD hypothesis, since a marginal increase in Þnal goods imports signiÞcantly reduces the industry PCM (see Co, 2001 , Levinsohn, 1993 , and Tybout, 2003 , for an overview),
irrespective of which sample of the data is considered. We Þnd that it is important to distinguish between Þnal goods imports and intermediate goods imports (international outsourcing), since their marginal impact on the industry PCM differs in sign (compare also the results between the parsimonious Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 on this). According to Table 3 , in both the full sample and the two subsample regressions the marginal effect of outsourcing is positive, signiÞcant at 1%, and robust with respect to outliers (compare the median regression results at the bottom of Table 3 ), pointing to the relevance of our theoretical model. According to our estimates, a one percentage point increase in 20 For instance, the marginal impact of outsourcing on the PCM in our case is ∂P CM ind,ijt /∂a Oij(t−1) = β 7 + β 8 m ij(t−1) + β 9 CR5 i(t−1) . Following Greene (1997) , we use the average of m i and CR5 i in the full sample or the two subsamples, as reported in Table 1 , to evaluate the effect. Since the focus of our paper lies on the impact of international outsourcing, the marginal effect of this variable is shown in Table 3 .
Marginal effects of the other explanatory variables are discussed in detail below but are not separately displayed in Table 3 . 21 In contrast to Co (2001) , our data do not allow to distinguish between changes in multinational activities due to greenÞeld investment and mergers and acquisitions. Co identiÞes a positive marginal effect of FDI in industries with low levels of concenration.
outsourcing leads to an increase in the PCM of about 0.5 percentage points on average.
Aggregating over the two different concepts of imports (Þnal and intermediate goods)
leads to upward biased estimates of the import-to-output parameters (compare Model 2
with Model 3 for all sample deÞnitions).
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> Table 2 . One, where we allow all variables (including the outsourcing-to-output ratio, a Oijt ) to develop as observed, and a second, where we hold the outsourcing-to-output ratio constant at its 1990 value in all industries and countries. The difference between the observed and the simulated change in PCMs can then be interpreted as the contribution of the outsourcing-to-output ratio change alone. Table 4 summarizes the simulation results. In the second row of Table 4 , we compute the difference between the model prediction with outsourcing as observed ("observed") and that one assuming outsourcing to be constant at the level of 1990 ("simulated"). According to our results, the average industry PCM Table 4 presents three additional rows of results, which summarize the Þndings of an analysis of variance of the "observed -simulated" change in PCMs. The corresponding numbers are to be interpreted as the contribution of the mentioned dimensions of variance (within industries and countries, between industries, between countries) to the overall variance of the outsourcing-induced change in PCMs. Since we focus on the short run (Þxed effects) impact, it is not surprising that the within industries and countries variation dominates. Additionally, we observe that outsourcing induces a considerable shift in PCMs across industries, whereas the impact on the cross country distribution of PCMs is only small and insigniÞcant.
Conclusions
This paper analyses the effects of outsourcing on price-cost margins in the EU12. From a model, where multinationals compete in quanities (Cournot) and other Þrms represent a competitive fringe, we expect a positive relationship between the industry price cost margin and market concentration (of multinationals) on the one hand, and (for a given level of multinationality) between the industry price-cost margin and international outsourcing on the other hand. Based on insights of our theoretical analysis, we construct an empirical model to test our hypotheses in a panel of 66 (aggregates of NACE 3-digit) industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s, respectively. Due to the lack of data, we use an industry's intermediate goods import to output ratio as a wide measure of international outsourcing and we use Þnal goods imports as an additional control variable, motivated by the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis. The empirical Þndings strongly support our theoretical hypotheses and underpin the importance of distinguishing between intermediate goods (international outsourcing) and Þnal goods imports to obtain unbiased estimates for both types of imports.
We undertake an experiment of thought to demonstrate the importance of outsourcing. In the 90s, especially the low-margins industries engaged in international outsourcing whereas we observe a decline in the outsourcing activity of the high-margins industries.
Price-cost margins in the average low-margins industry would have declined by 0.5 percentage points faster between 1991 and 1998 if the observed increase in international outsourcing since 1990 had not taken place. Moreover, the reduction in international outsourcing accounts for an additional decline in the EU12 high-margins industries by about 0.1 percentage points. In that way, the observed change in outsourcing has induced a convergence of EU12 industry price-cost margins and has led to a considerable shift in the distribution of margins across industries rather than across countries. However, for a deeper understanding of this convergence effect of international outsourcing further theoretical and empirical research is needed.
according to (3) and (4). Then, the linearization of system (9) is
23 According to system (9), we use
Proof of Proposition 1
Use dm = dn = dN = 0 and, in addition, dτ = 0 and apply Cramer's rule to (10). Then, we obtain
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to Þnd
According to the Euler theorem we can use
so that (14) can be simpliÞed to
Moreover, consider
, and
to obtain
for the denominator of (11). Then, substituting (17) and (19) in (11) gives dq/ds < 0.
Moreover, due to
da O /ds < 0 directly follows from (17), according to Cramer's rule.
Use dq/ds < 0 in (5) to obtain dCR/ds < 0. Finally, use P CM mult = 1/ (n |ε|) and note that |ε| = A−bnq bnq is declining in q to obtain dP CM mult /ds < 0 and therefore dP CM ind /ds < 0, according to (6).
Similarily, use dm = dn = dN = 0 and ds = 0, instead of dτ = 0. Moreover, note that
according to (10). Then,
implies dq/dτ < 0, according to (17) and Cramer's rule. Moreover, due to
da O /dτ < 0 directly follows from (17), according to Cramer's rule.
Use dq/dτ < 0 in (5) to obtain dCR/dτ < 0. Finally, dP CM ind /dτ < 0 is a direct consequence of dP CM mult /dτ < 0, according to (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Use ds = dτ = dn = dN = 0 in (10) and
according to (9), together with (12) to Þnd
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This implies dq/dm = 0, according to Cramer's rule. Moreover, due to
we Þnd that da O /dm > 0, according to (17) and Cramer's rule.
Use dq/dm = 0 in (5) to Þnd dCR/dm = 0. Finally, use P CM mult = 1/ (n |ε|) and note that
follows, according to (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Use ds = dτ = dm = dN = 0 in (10) and note that
is an immediate consequence of (12). According to (17) and Cramer's rule, we obtain dq/dn < 0. Moreover, due to
it directly follows that da O /dn < 0.
Use the Euler theorem, according to (16) , to obtain dq/dn = −q/ (n + 1) from (17) and (27) . Then, we Þnd
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24 Eq. (36) is not an explicit solution for the optimal output level q * , since ∂C (·) /∂ (mq) is a function of q.
according to (3) to reformulate (35) as
Rearranging terms in (37) gives
with e 1 > 1, according to (3), e 2 > 1, according to (36) and e 3 < 1. Since e 1 · e 2 · e 3 T n 2 and, therefore, also the sign of dP CM ind dn cannot be generally determined we use the following (linearly homogenous) speciÞcation for cost function C (·):
In the symmetric equilibrium, the Þrst derivatives of C (·) with respect to q and a O are given by
respectively. Hence, we obtain
. In view of (4), it follows that
By substituting the latter expression in (39) it can be
shown that e 1 · e 2 · e 3 T n 2 and, therefore, also the sign of 
Proof of Proposition 4
Use dt = dτ = dm = dn = 0 in (10) and note that according to (9). Then,
According to (17) and Cramer's rule, we obtain dq/dN < 0. Moreover, due to
it directly follows that da O /dN < 0.
Use dq/dN < 0 in (5) to Þnd dCR/dN < 0. Finally, use P CM mult = 1/ (n |ε|) and note that
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